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Preface 
I have always thought that there is something inherently wrong with having 
an interest to pursue politics as a primary vocation. From my early age I 
disliked the idea of imposing a will or even one’s own personal thoughts 
and beliefs on others. I find those who thirst for power throughout public 
institutions most responsible for creating an aggressive policy of a state, 
when such case occurs. Therefore, it has ever been an interest of mine to 
explore and put forward as much detriments caused by one's aspirations 
towards gaining and exercising authority. I use the prism of the crime of 
aggression to express my personal views on what is wrong with the (legal) 
world. 
 
This work represents a product of many people who influenced me in 
different ways. I see my role as of a mere observer, who found an 
inspiration to record what was thought well enough by other respectful 
minds. First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to the Swedish 
Institute for providing me with the full study SI Scholarship for Western 
Balkans during these two years at Lund University. It would not be possible 
for me to study abroad without their financial support. Secondly, my 
colleagues and the professors from Lund University who inspired me with 
their ideas, expressed many times during different lectures and fika's, are 
one of those that I am thankful for.  
 
Without the enduring support of my friends back home, to whom I owe 
everything, I would not be able to write this thesis. They believe in me more 
than I could ever possibly do so for myself. Therefore, I find it convenient 
to mention them by name: Marija, Roda, Mišo, Dragan, Mladen, Ceca, 
Mina, Bilja, Žela, Bane, Jovan, kum Šoki, kum Coa, Gruja, Aleksandar, 
Dejan, Sonja, Mika, Dario, Željko, Ognjen, Sale, Smilja, Vlajko, Zole, 
Bojke, Ognjen, Niki, Goxi, Martin, Nathalie and my dearest Lotta. I 
specially want to thank to my mom who thought me about the value of 
knowledge and the pleasures that come together with it. Without her love 
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and endless support I would not be able to accomplish much of what is 
generally accepted to be call as ‘success’. However, as far as I am 
concerned, my greatest success is the friends that I am privileged to have.  
 
Those above mentioned are to be credited for many joys that I have 
experienced since I started the master's course in Sweden. However, I 
express my deepest appreciation to my supervisor Professor Christoffer 
Wong who is the main 'culprit' for my academic development. I have been 
extremely lucky to have a supervisor who cared so much about my work, 
and who was so zealous in responding to my queries and questions. He was 
more than thoughtful and throughout my entire master studies he was my 
true academic inspiration. He inspired me to become a professor one day so 
I can treat my students same as he treated me. 
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Abbreviations  
Articles on State Responsibility  Articles on Responsibility of States for  
      Internationally Wrongful Acts 
ASP      Assembly of States Parties  
ICC      International Criminal Court  
ICC Statute; Rome Statute   Statute of the International Criminal 
Court 
ICJ      International Court of Justice 
ICTY     International Crime Tribunal for the  
      former Yugoslavia  
IHL     International Humanitarian Law  
IMT; the Tribunal    Nuremberg International Military  
      Tribunal  
IMTFE; Tokyo Tribunal   International Military Tribunal for the 
Far East 
Law No. 10    Control Council Law No. 10 
London Charter; IMT Charter  Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal  
NMT      Nuremberg Military Tribunal 
SC      Security Council 
SWGCA     Special Working Group on the Crime 
      of Aggression  
Tokyo Charter    Charter of the International Military  
      Tribunal for the Far East  
Tokyo Judgment    IMTFE Judgment 
UN      United Nations  
UN Charter; Charter    The Charter of the United Nations  
UN General Assembly   United Nations General Assembly 
USSR      Soviet Union  
WWI      First World War  
WWII      World War II  
1974 Resolution    1974 UN General Assembly   
      Resolution 
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Summary 
The Nuremberg Charter introduced the crime of aggression into 
international law. The American Chief Prosecutor Justice Robert Jackson 
gave a famous promise that offenders who commit acts of aggression shall 
be prosecuted and international criminal law would be applied against them. 
However, only at the first Review Conference of the ICC Statute in 
Kampala 2010, agreement on a universally accepted definition was reached. 
To this end, Articles 15bis and 15ter of the ICC Statute prescribe the 
possibility of the court to exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression after 1 January 2017.   
 
What distinguishes the crime of aggression from other core crimes under the 
ICC jurisdiction — namely, genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes — is its leadership nature. According to Articles 8bis(1) and 25(3bis) 
ICC Statute, only a person in a position to 'direct or control' political or 
military action of a state could be found guilty for the crime of aggression. 
Notably, the structure of Article 25 ICC Statue — which articulates 
different modes of individual criminal responsibility for the under the ICC 
purview — is now limited to only a narrow group of people within a state, 
who could meet the leadership requirement.  
 
The introduction of the 'direct or control' clause represents a novelty of the 
new definition of the crime of aggression. It is true that ever since the post-
World War II trials the crime of aggression was somewhat 'reserved' only to 
the policy-makers. The opinion that hallmarked the discourse on individual 
criminal responsibility regarding this crime, advocated that low-ranking 
state officials lacked the requisite mental element in that by virtue of their 
position they may not know the aggressive plans of their country. Therefore, 
it would be at variance with the interests of justice to prosecute those 
individuals for aggression. 
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Not an every post-World War II tribunal set forth the leadership criteria 
explicitly. However, they all had a pattern they followed in tracing down 
potential perpetrators who could be regarded as leaders. After the High 
Command case, the Nuremberg Military Tribunal unequivocally stated that 
only individuals at the policy level could be convicted for the crime of 
aggression. By way of example, the leadership standard of 'shape or 
influence' was adopted for the first time in international criminal law. 
  
The requirement of 'shape or influence' was highly disputed in scholarship 
as it captures a broad group of persons who could meet this criterion. On the 
other hand, the ICC's standard of 'direct or control' seems to suffice the 
interest of justice in a more coherent way. Or, in another key, in those terms 
the commitment of the crime of aggression will entail criminal 
responsibility only if the perpetrators were in a position of political or 
military leadership and organized or planned aggression. It captures only 
those individuals who have decision-making power on behalf of a state to 
carry out aggression. Accordingly, low-level state officials are excluded by 
adopting this standard, which was indeed the intention of the architects of 
international criminal law. 
 
The leadership clause evolved but the purpose remained the same, i.e. the 
aim of the leadership requirement is to narrow down potential perpetrators 
for the crime of aggression only to persons who are regarded as policy-
makers or simply 'leaders'. However, as the both terms 'direct' and 'control' 
have never been used in international criminal law, the scope of application 
is not quite clear from the wording of the ICC Statute. In order to consider 
this in depth, the author will firstly discuss the meaning and effects of the 
first standard of 'shape or influence', and subsequently consider its 
interpretation by post-World War II tribunals. After presenting this initial 
analysis, the thesis will ponder on the ICC's standard of 'direct or control'. 
Within the chapter that introduces leadership, in sake of producing a robust 
argument on identifying potential perpetrators who could meet this standard, 
there will be some theoretical considerations about the conceptual 
underpinnings of the leadership nature of a crime as such.  
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1. Introduction 
A. Background 
It is perhaps rather difficult for one to understand why the international 
community after more than two millenniums of history of warfare had to 
struggle to bring those who were seen as most responsible for the atrocities 
occurred during World War II (WWII) to face the trial. One of the reasons 
was the prevailing opinion concerning individual criminal responsibility 
prior to the wake of the 20th century, which was remarkably different from 
the one accepted today. In effect, state leaders enjoyed absolute impunity 
for most of the time throughout the course of history. Up until the end of 
WWII, it was held that emperors, kings, tsars etc. should not be responsible 
to other states for the crimes committed within the borders of their country.  
 During the Medieval period — more precisely, in the sixteenth century 
— the theory of state sovereignty emerged as a core principle in interstate 
relations.1 It furthered this idea of impunity to the even greater extent. One 
of the main features was the state privilege to enjoy supreme authority over 
its own people within its borders. State leaders used it as a shield against 
individual responsibility for their personal wrongdoings as it was believed 
that they were acting in the name of the whole country. In that time, subjects 
of international law were only the states. Accordingly, individuals could not 
be internationally responsible and the only sovereign power that could try 
them was their own country. In reality, when one country conquers another 
or when the belligerents sign an armistice, leaders of both countries would 
be amnestied and allowed to return to their public life. 
 At the same time, there was an ongoing struggle between the two 
naturally confronted sides, i.e. the government authority on the one, and the 
human rights movement embodied in, what we call today — civil society, 
on the other. States did not want to give up their privileges so easily in favor 
of civil rights and freedoms. One among those privileges was the absolute 
impunity of their leaders. Civil wars all across Europe were mired in the 
                                                
1  See J. Bodin, Les Six Livres de la République, Vol. 1 (Paris: Fayard, 1576) at 179–228. 
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transition from a ‘culture of impunity’ to a ‘culture of accountability’. 
Human rights movement praised many glories in different fields of civil 
liberties. However, the question of international criminal responsibility was 
finally brought to the table only after the First World War (WWI). 
 WWI is seen as the seminal event in the transposition of a ‘culture of 
impunity’ to a ‘culture of accountability’.2 In the wake of war, the Allied 
countries started to promote the opinion that Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany 
should face criminal responsibility for war crimes committed therein. The 
1919 Treaty of Versailles provided the legal basis for the establishment of a 
special tribunal for Kaiser Wilhelm. 3  Those occurrences sparked the 
paradigm shift between the two cultures, which resulted in the first attempt 
to try individuals for international crimes. Nevertheless, proceedings never 
took place as the Netherlands refused to surrender the Kaiser to the Allies.4  
 The first international trial for what amounts to today’s crime of 
aggression was held before the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal 
(IMT; the Tribunal) following WWII, under the name of ‘crimes against 
peace’. Article 6(a) of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (the 
London Charter; the IMT Charter) 5  defines crimes against peace as 
‘planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war 
in violation of international treaties, agreements, or assurances, or 
participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any 
of the foregoing.’ The Tribunal held that ‘Crimes against International Law 
are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing 
individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of International 
                                                
2  P.G. Lauren, ‘From impunity to accountability: Forces of transformation and the 
changing international human rights context’, in R. Thakur and P. Malcontent (eds), 
From Sovereign Impunity to International Accountability: The search for Justice in a 
World of States (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2004) 15–42, at 15. 
3  M.C. Bassiouni, ‘World War I, “The War to End All Wars” and the Birth of a 
Handicapped International Criminal Justice System’, 30 Denver Journal of 
International Law and Policy (2002) 244, at 269–273. 
4  Ibid. 
5  Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the 
European Axis, with annexed Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 
(hereinafter the ‘London Charter’), 82 UNTS 279, 59 Stat. 1544, 8 August 1945. 
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Law be enforced.’6 This revolutionary sentence represented the official end 
of era of ‘culture of impunity’. No longer could state leaders hide behind the 
veil of state sovereignty as they became legitimate subjects of international 
law. Moreover, this wording hallmarked the emergence of international 
criminal law as a system of secondary provisions that should serve as a 
mechanism for enforcement primary norms of international law. 
 The effort that has been made during the trial in order to bring to justice 
individuals who were most responsible for mass atrocities, most certainly, 
puts the whole proceedings into praise. Nevertheless, the judgment failed to 
provide a plausible argument that the verdicts for this crime were in line 
with the fundamental principle of nullum crimen sine lege.7 Even during the 
London Conference it was argued that no customary law existed which 
prohibited aggressive war. However, by dint of a few concessions general 
consensus was reached that the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact represents a 
material source, viz. legal basis under which the ‘crimes against peace’ were 
criminalized.  
 While acknowledging the flaws of the process and the shortcomings of 
the judgment, no one can really deny that the Nuremberg trial was the 
trigger for the international community to define the rules of waging war in 
a more detailed manner. Shortly after the judgment, the United Nations 
General Assembly (UN General Assembly) affirmed ‘the principle of 
international law recognized by the IMT Charter and the judgment of 
Tribunal’.8 However, initial enthusiasm died somewhere on the road and the 
process of criminalizing aggression became rather onerous and daunting. 
 There are many reasons for the absence of international follow-up to the 
criminalization of aggression after WWII. One of them is the adoption of 
the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter; the Charter),9 which spelled 
                                                
6  United States et al. v. Göring et al., Trial of the Major War Criminals before the 
International Military Tribunal, 14 November 1945 – 1 October 1946, Vol. I (1947), at 
447 (hereinafter the ‘IMT Judgment’). 
7  See T. Weigend, ‘“In general a principle of justice”: The Debate on the “Crime against 
Peace” in the Wake of the Nuremberg Judgment’, 10 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice (2012) 41–58, at 41.  
8  GA Res. 95 (I), 11 December 1946, para.1. 
9  Charter of the United Nations, 1 UNTS XVI, 24 October 1945. 
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out conditions and rules for the legal use of armed force. The UN Charter 
rejected the notion of the use of force as a means for settling disputes. 
Article 2(4) of the Charter recognizes the obligation to refrain in 
international relations ‘from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.’ However, there are 
two exceptions from this fundamental principle. The right to self-defense 
represents the main exception to the prohibition on the use of force. It has 
been introduced in Article 51 of the UN Charter. Two requirements for the 
lawful application of this article are proportionality and necessity. The 
second exception to the prohibition on the use of force is authorization of 
the use of force by the Security Council (SC). The SC authorizes the use of 
force by United Nations (UN) peacekeeping or peace-enforcement missions 
or by coalition of forces of states.10  
 At the time of the adoption of the Charter, the international community 
was relying on its provisions in order to prevent future acts of aggression. 
For Antonio Cassese, this was one of the major factors that shaped the 
discourse in the process of criminalizing aggression.11 Yet, the existence of 
norms enshrined in the UN Charter was only one of the reasons for the 60 
yearlong quest for a definition of aggression.  
 In the second half of 20th century the Cold War occurred all across the 
world, as a state of political and military tension between two powers that 
took place. On the one side the United States with NATO and others created 
the so-called Western Bloc. On the other side, the Soviet Union (USSR) and 
its allies created the Eastern Block as opponent to the prior. During this 
period, the wartime alliance against Germany from the WWII was broken, 
leaving the communistic USSR and the capitalistic US with profound 
differences over democracy. The Cold War ‘prompted members of the two 
blocs to refrain from fleshing out the rules on the crime of aggression for 
fear that they might be used in the ideological and political struggle between 
                                                
10  See Ibid., Chapter VII. 
11  See A. Cassese, International Criminal Law, (3rd edn., Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), at 138. 
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the blocs…’12 and rendered ‘a general hesitancy by all major powers to 
elaborate upon aggression, so as to retain as much latitude as possible in the 
application of the rules on self-defense.’13  
 Nevertheless, the successor to the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals14 
came only after almost half a century, when the crime of aggression became 
one of the four crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC).15 Article 5(2) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC Statute; Rome Statute)16 prescribes however that the ICC may not 
exercise that jurisdiction until a ‘provision is adopted … defining the crime 
and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise 
jurisdiction with respect to this crime.’ The compromise for the definition 
has been finally reached at the first Review Conference of the ICC Statute 
in Kampala 2010. To this end, Articles 15bis and 15ter of the ICC Statute 
prescribes the possibility of the court to prosecute the crime of aggression 
after 1 January 2017.   
B. The Problem and the Questions of Research 
When it comes to the crime itself, same as for every other international 
crime, a person can be held responsible for the crime of aggression only if 
his conducts were unlawful (actus reus) and if he had the necessary intent 
and knowledge (mens rea). There is another requirement that makes the 
crime of aggression somewhat ‘unique’, different from any other 
international crime. Ever since the Nuremberg trials, aggression has been 
considered as a leadership crime.17 According to the ICC Statute, the crime 
                                                
12  Ibid., at 139. 
13  Ibid. 
14  For the exhaustive list of trials, see United Nations Was Crimes Commission, 15 
Volumes of Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals (1947–1949), available at 
http://www.unwcc.org/documents/ [accessed at 25 February 2015]. 
15  Art. 5(1) ICCSt. 
16  A/CONF.183/9, 17 July 1998, and corrected by proces-verbaux of 10 November 1998, 
12 July 1999, 30 November 1999, 8 May 2000, 16 January 2001 and 17 January 2001 
(entry into force: 1 July 2002). 
17  See K.J. Heller, ‘Retreat from Nuremberg: The Leadership Requirement in the Crime 
of Aggression’, 18 The European Journal of International Law  (2007) 477–497, at 
479. 
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of aggression can be committed only ‘by a person in a position effectively 
to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a 
State’.18 
 However, problem could arise in the pursuit of individual criminal 
responsibility, as the leadership concept is somewhat fuzzy. What should be 
the key principle that will guide us in discovering who are the leaders, or to 
be more precise, who are those persons that are in a position to ‘control or 
direct’ military or political action of a state? Cohen posed a similar question 
arguing that mass carnages are 
the product of collective, systematic, bureaucratic activity, made 
possible only by the collaboration of massive and complex 
organizations in the execution of criminal policies initiated at the 
highest levels of government. How, then, is individual 
responsibility to be located, limited, and defined within the vast 
bureaucratic apparatuses that make possible the pulling of a trigger 
or the dropping of a gas canister in some far-flung place?19 
Arguably, the answer to this question represents the main challenge for the 
International Criminal Court in respect of the crime of aggression. Legal 
systems are different in every country and they could vary significantly. The 
first resort should be the examination of the Constitutional provisions in 
order to see who has the right to direct political or military actions of a state. 
It should be borne in mind that the leadership standard goes beyond de jure 
holders of power. For instance, if Hitler had survived the WWII, there is no 
doubt that he would face charges for the crimes against peace. On the other 
hand, Japanese Emperor was not considered responsible for the aggressive 
war that his country waged.  
 According to the ICC Statue, other public figures than the highest 
authority in a state are not precluded meet the standard of ‘control or direct’, 
e.g. economic or spiritual leaders. By way of example, it is clear that a lot of 
effort will be invested in capturing potential perpetrators and convicting 
them of the crime of aggression. The bottom line is that pursuing individual 
                                                
18  Art. 8bis(1) ICCSt.  
19 D. Cohen, 'Beyond Nuremberg: Individual Responsibility for War Crimes', in C. Hesse 
and R. Post (eds), Human Rights in Political Transitions: Gettysburg to Bosnia (New 
York: Zone Books, 1999) 53–92, at 53. 
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criminal responsibility implies a different approach in every case of alleged 
aggression. 
 
Hence, this work will dwell on the following questions:  
 
How does the leadership clause of the crime of aggression reflect on 
individual criminal responsibility and how to identify potential perpetrators 
that could meet the leadership requirement when an act of aggression 
occurs? 
C. The Research Method and the Structure of the Work 
In the pursuit of answers for the posed questions, the current thesis will be 
delimited to the work of international criminal tribunals. The research will 
explore the relevant case law of the post-WWII trials in depth, as the only 
international jurisprudence regarding the crime of aggression is attached to 
those trials. Apart from that, the leadership clause from the ICC Statute will 
be examined together with its implications on individual criminal 
responsibility. Both terms that constitute the leadership — namely, 'control' 
and 'direct' — are taken from the Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (Articles on State Responsibility), thus 
Article 17 thereof will be examined accordingly. Moreover, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) tackled the issue of 'effective control', 
which is indeed pertinent to the research problem that I am posing in this 
paper. Hence, its reasoning will be acknowledged in this paper as well.  
 In this essay I will attempt to provide answers to the research problem 
by using the positivistic approach as a first recourse. Accordingly, I will 
strive to provide an accurate understanding on where the current 
international law stands in this area of study. It is indeed evaluative research 
and hence the law will be subjected to appraisal from the point of view of 
coherence with earlier law. To this end, the law being considered is the 
applicable law before the ICC of which the Rome Statute is the primary law. 
By using this methodology, I will explore and endeavor to explain the role 
of the leadership clause in identifying perpetrators for the crime of 
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aggression. In effect, in the empirical part of my research I will observe 
mainly the primary sources of law in order to examine the effects of 
leadership requirement on individual criminal responsibility. Moreover, I 
will avail myself of the opinions of respectful scholars in order to 
substantiate my argument and make it sounder. The empirical research is 
what has been employed primarily in this paper, however there will be some 
theoretical contemplation on the issue as well.  
 The structure of the essay is determined by its aim which is the analysis 
and application of the leadership clause in international criminal law. I will 
start by delegitimizing the crime and its importance in the second chapter. 
Other three core crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC (genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes) have indeed the potential to drag state 
leaders into the realm of individual criminal responsibility. However, I will 
put forward the reasons why I think it is important to prosecute aggression, 
as there will be a situation where other crimes could not suffice the interests 
of justice.  
 As I move forward, I will introduce the notion of individual criminal 
responsibility for the crime prior to the agreement on Kampala's 
amendments on the one hand, and I will shed some light on novelties that 
came out with the 2010 definition, on the other. In the last section of the 
second chapter I will examine the concept of leadership in international 
criminal law, which represents the essence of this research. Accordingly, I 
will discuss the scope of its implication on individual criminal responsibility 
and thus present a problem concerning the interpretation. Immediately after 
I introduce the leadership clause in this paper, I will ponder on conceptual 
understandings of the leadership nature of the crime of aggression. To that 
end, I will use the Weberian theory of authority with its implication in 
international criminal law. According to the ICC Statute, crime of 
aggression is attached exclusively to states, viz. only those entities could 
commit aggression. The Weberian legal-rational concept of authority 
provides a comprehensive study of behavioral choices of superiors and 
subordinates within a bureaucratic apparatus, thus providing me with a 
possibility to explore the notion of leadership from a sociological 
perspective. I will avail myself of this theory in order to elucidate why the 
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crime of aggression is reserved only for policy-makers. Moreover, this 
doctrine will help me to shed light on those bearers of power who could 
meet the policy-level requirement and therefore entail individual criminal 
responsibility if their state has carried out aggression. 
 Chapters three and four are reserved for the discussion about persons 
who are accorded with such authority that could meet the leadership 
standard. Firstly, I will analyze how the relevant post-WWII courts dealt 
with this issue. Some of them did not adopt the leadership requirements 
explicitly. However, they all had the pattern they followed in determining 
perpetrators in this respect. Important feature that links all the accused — 
who were eventually convicted for aggression — is nonetheless their 
leadership role. In the fourth chapter I will study the ICC’s approach 
towards the crime of aggression. There has been a shift in the policy from 
the ‘shape or influence’ to ‘direct or control’, which I will put forward 
accordingly together with the reasons that I found. I will summarize that 
chapter by stating pros and cons of the ICC standard with the conclusion 
which clearly shows my inclinations towards the new approach. 
 By way of conclusion, I will sum up all the work that has been done in 
this thesis and give a general comment about the law that governs the 
leadership clause of the crime of aggression, which is indeed a central issue 
in this thesis.  
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2. Prosecuting Aggression  
In this thesis, I shall focus on both normative and conceptual questions that 
concern substantive international criminal law. In my view, the scope of 
individual criminal responsibility for the new crime of aggression is unclear. 
My idea is to discuss only about one out of many aspects that in a way 
determine responsibility viz. the leadership requirement. However, not too 
many international lawyers are enthusiastic, that at least said, about the idea 
of prosecuting for this crime. Why they should be interested, not necessary 
enthusiastic, I will try to explain in next few paragraphs. 
A. Delegitimizing the Crime 
In the immediate aftermath of WWII, international law emerged as a 
universally accepted system of norms with a primary goal to govern the 
peaceful relations between states.  The UN Charter rejected the notion of the 
use of force as a means for settling disputes. Article 2(4) of the Charter 
recognizes the obligation to refrain in international relations ‘from the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations.’  
 On the other hand, American Chief Prosecutor in Nuremberg, Justice 
Robert Jackson, gave a famous promise that the new international criminal 
law will stand as a bulwark against aggressive wars and that all violators 
will be tried for crimes against peace.20 Jackson stated that  
[t]he ultimate step in avoiding periodic wars, which are inevitable 
in a system of international lawlessness, is to make statesmen 
responsible to law. And let me make clear that while this is first 
applied against German aggressors, the law includes, and if it is to 
serve a useful purpose it must condemn, aggression by other 
nations, including those which sit here now in judgment.21 
                                                
20  See Opening Speech of the Chief Prosecutor for the United States, reprinted in Trial of 
German Major War Criminals by the International Military Tribunal Sitting at 
Nuremberg Germany (Buffalo: William S. Hein & Co., 2001), at 45. 
21  Ibid. 
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At that time, the international community was shocked by the atrocities that 
have happened during WWII and therefore the focus was on brining to 
justice those who were most responsible for commencing a war at the first 
place. During the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, but also in the following 
years, it was believed that the crime of aggression is the quintessential crime 
in international criminal law. However, from the historical trajectory of 
international relations in the second half of 20th century, other conclusion 
can be reached than the one ostensibly intended. To give an answer to the 
question of: 'to what extent has the existence of the crime of aggression 
under customary international law deterred states in resorting to use of 
force?' that would praise the importance of the crime is almost impossible 
for several reasons. Certainly, the most obvious one is the absence of the 
international consensus on the definition at the first place.  
 On the other hand, the existence of other three other core crimes, which 
are under the jurisdiction of the ICC,22 could indeed capture the conduct of 
high-state leaders and drag them into the realm of individual criminal 
responsibility. During the post-WWII trials, the indictments against accused 
were based on: crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.23 In 1948, the UN General Assembly adopted the Convention on 
the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.24 The crime 
of genocide was introduced as an intrinsic part of international criminal law. 
During the 1990’s, conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia gave the necessary impetus to 
the birth of the first international tribunal since the post-WWII trials — 
namely, International Crime Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).25  
Notwithstanding the fact that the crime of aggression was not in the purview 
of the ICTY, most of the leaders who were responsible for mass carnages 
during the civil war were indicted before the court.  The reason for that is 
perhaps best articulated in Mauro Politi's assertion that three ‘core crimes’ 
                                                
22  See Art. 5 ICCSt. 
23  See e.g., IMT Judgment, at 12. 
24 UN General Assembly, Prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, 9 
December 1948, A/RES/260, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f0873.html [accessed 3 October 2014]. 
25  Adopted SC Res. 827 (1993); as amended SR Res. 1166 (1998); as amended SR Res. 
1329 (2000); as amended SR Res. 1411 (2002). 
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(war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide) ‘normally accompany 
the commissions of an act of aggression and may equally be object of 
charges against high political and military leaders.26  
 It is hard to perceive a situation where one will be accused solely for the 
crime of aggression. Jurisprudence of the ICTY shows that there are other 
means by which one could be brought before justice for commencing a war. 
The more the war is lasting, the less are the chances that there will be no 
violations of international law beside the prohibition of commencing a war. 
It is very hard to accept a rather naive opinion that during the long-lasting 
armed conflict one could be tried only for the crime of aggression and not 
for the others international crimes. The crime of aggression will be one 
among a few counts of the indictment, and perhaps, not even the first one. 
 Nevertheless, prosecuting aggression could indeed further the interests 
of justice in cases where other core crimes succumb to their limitations. 
There could be a situation where high-state official would declare a war and 
commit act of aggression against ‘the sovereignty, territorial integrity or 
political independence of another state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Charter of the United Nations’27 — thus invoking individual 
criminal responsibility for the crime of aggression — however, without 
breaching rules of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and entailing 
responsibility for other international crimes. In this case, it should be borne 
in mind that there is a threshold requirement in the definition of aggression 
that in a way excludes criminal liability for ‘short wars’; thus, only a war 
that ‘by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of 
the Charter of the United Nations’ is criminalized.28 The situation where the 
possibility for prosecuting aggression could be fully utilized is a 'short war'; 
i.e. the war lasting for a short period of time which however represents a 
manifest violation of the UN Charter. Having in mind the technological and 
                                                
26  M. Politi, ‘The ICC and the Crime of Aggression: A Dream that Came Through and the 
Reality Ahead’, 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2012) 267–288, at 270–
271. 
27  Art. 8bis(2) ICCSt. 
28  See Art. 8bis(1) ICCSt. 
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military advances of certain states, we should not exclude the possibility of 
such occurrences to happen in a near future. 
 Finally, in sake of the legal certainty there should be predictability in the 
application of legal norms. Therefore, as the ICC included this crime in its 
purview, in the strict legal sense, there should be a clear legal framework 
that will guide the prosecution and the chamber in deciding whether one’s 
actions entail individual criminal responsibility or not. According to the 
Rome Statute, conditions for asserting individual criminal responsibility in 
this respect have changed from the ones in the aftermath of WWII. 
International criminal law is now facing the new challenges and the interests 
of justice once again need to be preserved. 
B. Aggression and Individual Criminal Responsibility 
1.  Individual Criminal Responsibility for the Crime of 
Aggression before 2010 Kampala Conference 
Before the Kampala Conference and the adoption of the definition of the 
crime of aggression, the main legal sources concerning individual criminal 
responsibility in this respect were the Nuremberg trial and the 1974 UN 
General Assembly Resolution (the 1974 Resolution). 29  The notion of 
individual criminal responsibility contains two essential injunctions — actus 
reus and mens rea. Accordingly, one could be held accountable for 
international crimes only if his conduct was unlawful and he had the 
necessary intent and knowledge. 
(a) Actus Reus 
The 1974 Resolution lists specific examples of acts of aggression, following 
the definition of aggression in a broad sense. Article 5(2) stipulates that ‘a 
war of aggression is a crime against international peace. Aggression gives 
rise to international responsibility.’ The 1974 Resolution comprises two 
basic approaches to aggression that have been disputed during the debates 
that preceded the adoption of the resolution.30 Article 1 of the Resolution 
                                                
29  GA Res. 3314 (XXIX), 14 December 1974 (hereinafter the ‘1974 Resolution’). 
30  See G. Kemp, ‘Individual Criminal Liability for the International Crime of Aggression’ 
(PhD thesis at Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch), at 162. 
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sets out the general definition of aggression: ‘Aggression is the use of armed 
force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition.’31 Article 3 
provides a list of acts that constitute aggression, such as invasion or attack, 
bombardment, the blockade of the ports or coasts, an armed attack etc.32 
 The basis for the 1974 Resolution is the UN Charter that provided the 
framework for the definition of act of aggression. The list of conducts 
prescribed in Article 3 has been used to guide the SC in deciding upon 
which wrongful uses of force amount to acts of aggression. 
(b) Mens Rea  
Individual criminal liability is not envisaged in the 1974 definition of 
aggression. The Resolution was primarily oriented towards the 
responsibility of states. There is no element of mens rea in the definition 
and it cannot ‘really serve as a basis for individual criminal liability for the 
crime of aggression.’33 At the first glance, the absence of provisions on 
individual criminal liability in the 1974 definition represents a lacuna from 
a criminal law perspective. However, it should be born in mind that the 
nature of the whole definition is state-centered and the definition itself 
cannot serve as the basis for individual criminal responsibility.34 
 In the period prior to Kampala, the judgment of the IMT was the key 
material source with regards to the criminal responsibility for aggression. 
Yoram Dinstein contended that a special kind of subjective element was 
developed around the concept of crimes against peace.35 The IMT stated 
that mens rea was a vital part of a crime together with the actus reus.36 
Kriangsak Kittichaiseree reaffirmed that mens rea in the crime of aggression 
                                                
31  Art. 1 of the ‘Definition of Aggression’, annexed to the 1974 Resolution.  
32  Art. 3 of the  ‘Definition of Aggression’, annexed to the 1974 Resolution. 
33  Kemp, supra note 30, at 162. 
34  Ibid., at 163. 
35  Y. Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (4th edn., Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), at 136. 
36  Ibid., at 137. 
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includes both intent and knowledge.37 He quoted the High Command case38 
in order to substantiate his view. The US Military Tribunal held that 
offenders who have been accused of the crime of aggression must have  
actual knowledge that an aggressive war is being intended and that 
if launched it will be an aggressive war. It requires in addition that 
the possessor of such knowledge, after he acquires it shall be in a 
position to shape or influence the policy that brings about its 
initiation or its continuance after its initiation, either by furthering, 
or by hindering or preventing it. If he then does the former, he 
becomes criminally responsible; if he does the latter to the extent of 
his ability, then his action shows the lack of criminal intent with 
respect to such policy…39 
The 1974 definition deserves credits for bringing one closer to an 
understanding of the acts of aggression. However, as the subjective element 
was not included, after the post-WWII proceedings there is no legal 
document adopted in the international sphere specifying mens rea for the 
crime of aggression.  In 2006, the House of Lords issued a judgment 
declaring that the crime of aggression is criminalized under customary 
international law.40 Lord Bingham of Cornhill, Lord Hoffmann and Lord 
Mance held that the crime of aggression had a definition comprising both 
elements of actus reus and mens rea required for a criminal offence.  
 There has been little state practice in this respect, thus customary 
international law remains unchanged from the jurisprudence of Nuremberg 
and Tokyo trials.41  
2. International Criminal Court and the Crime of Aggression 
The night of 11–12 June 2010 in Kampala will be remembered as a 
historical moment when the first Review Conference of the ICC Statute 
reached an agreement on the crime of aggression. Despite years of 
                                                
37  K. Kittichaiseree, International Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001), at 221. 
38  U.S. v. von Leeb et al., in Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military 
Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Nuremberg, October 1946 – April 1949, 
Vol. XI (1950) (hereinafter the ‘High Command case’). 
39  Ibid., at 487.  
40  [2006] UKHL 16 R. v. Jones and others, para.19.  
41  R. Cryer et al., An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (2nd edn., 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 321. 
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multilateral negotiations pre- and post-Rome, delegates arrived at Kampala 
with a whole set of contentious issues. Nevertheless, the definition of the 
crime of aggression enjoyed a shaky consensus.42 When the presidential 
hammer went down, announcing the achievement of finding a compromise, 
an outburst of collective joy spread across the whole room.43 The 60 year 
long process of criminalizing aggression finally reached its end. The 
definition is spelled out in the Article 8bis of the Rome Statute, which reads: 
Article 8bis 
Crime of aggression 
1. For the purpose of this Statute, “crime of aggression” means the 
planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a 
position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political 
or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its 
character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the 
Charter of the United Nations. 
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, “act of aggression” means the 
use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Any of 
the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in 
accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 
(XXIX) of 14 December 1974, qualify as an act of aggression: 
a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the 
territory of another State, or any military occupation, however 
temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any 
annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or 
part thereof; 
b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory 
of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the 
territory of another State; 
c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces 
of another State; 
d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air 
forces, or marine and air fleets of another State; 
                                                
42  B.v. Schaack, ‘Negotiating at the Interface of Power and Law: The Crime of 
Aggression’, 49 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (2011) 505–601, at 513. 
43  C. Kress and L. v. Holtzendorff, ‘The Kampala Compromise on the Crime of 
Aggression’, 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2010) 1179–1217, at 1180. 
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e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the 
territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving State, 
in contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or 
any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the 
termination of the agreement; 
f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed 
at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for 
perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State; 
g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, 
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force 
against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed 
above, or its substantial involvement therein. 
By observing Article 8bis one may notice that it is structured in three levels. 
Firstly, the crime of aggression is defined in the first paragraph as the ‘… 
planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position 
effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military 
action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and 
scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.’ 
In this respect, several notions raise certain conceptual contention in the 
international criminal law discourse. One of them is the ‘control or to direct’ 
standard, which will be analyzed in a more detailed manner infra. Secondly, 
the nexus between individual criminal acts on the one side, and the acts of 
aggression of a state on another, has been made in the first paragraph of 
Article 8bis, whilst the definition of acts of aggression itself is spelled out in 
paragraph two therein. Finally, the third level of this structure is articulated 
in seven subparagraphs of paragraph two, which represent a list of acts 
qualifying as aggression pursuit to the 1974 Resolution. 
 It is important to stress that the occurrence of an unlawful act of 
aggression does not automatically entail the criminal responsibility of 
individuals involved in that act.44 There are at least three conditions that 
need to be fulfilled in order for such responsibility to arise.45 In the first 
place, the act of aggression must ‘… by its character, gravity and scale, 
                                                
44  K. Ambos, ‘The Crime of Aggression after Kampala’, 53 German Yearbook of 
International Law (2011) 463–509, at 482. 
45  S. Sayapin, The Crime of Aggression in International Criminal Law: Historical 
Development, Comparative Analysis and Present State (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser 
Press, 2014), at 257. 
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constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.’ 
Secondly, the ‘control or to direct' requirement — with a purpose to narrow 
down potential perpetrators to a state’s high representatives — must be met. 
Finally, if an act of aggression occurs and a person in the dock is regarded 
as a leader — in terms of Article 8bis ICC Statute — he will be held 
criminally responsible only if his contribution to the ‘planning, preparation, 
initiation or execution’ of an acts of aggression is proven.46  
 While the definition of an act of aggression was taken in verbatim from 
the Resolution, there are at least two novelties in Article 8bis(1) ICC 
Statute. 47 The first novelty is the threshold requirement for prosecuting 
aggression only in regards to acts that ‘by its character, gravity and scale, 
constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations’.48 
Obviously, the purpose is to exclude from criminalization minor incidents 
like border skirmishes or legally controversial cases like humanitarian 
intervention, both of which the Special Working Group on Crime of 
Aggression (SWGCA) considered should be dealt with outside the ambit of 
the ICC.49 Secondly, the crime of aggression stipulates individual criminal 
responsibility with respect only to persons in a position to ‘control or direct' 
state policy, contrary to the 'shape or influence' standard affirmed in 
customary international law.  
 Next section will ponder on the meaning of the ‘leadership clause’ and 
its reflections on individual criminal responsibility. Both normative and 
conceptual questions are going to be addressed. The new standard of ‘direct 
or control’ that was adopted in Kampala represents a shift in international 
policy with regards to the persons that should be brought to justice in this 
respect. The focus now is on the narrow circle of people among various 
state leaders.  
                                                
46  Ibid. 
47 Ambos, supra note 44, at 466–467. 
48  Ibid. 
49  More about this point will be said in chapter 4. 
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C. The Leadership Clause 
Ever since the post-WWII trials, it has always been universally accepted 
that only high-ranking state agents can commit the crime of aggression. The 
‘famous’ leadership clause articulates that the crime of aggression can be 
committed only ‘by a person in a position effectively to exercise control 
over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of 
aggression’.50 The purpose of this provision is to narrow down the scope of 
potential perpetrators that can be prosecuted for the crime of aggression. 
According to the jurisprudence of international tribunals, both in Nuremberg 
and Tokyo, the judges were of the opinion that lower ranking state officials 
should not be held responsible in respect of this crime, because they are 
lacking in mental element.51 In effect, common foot soldiers cannot be 
responsible for the crime of aggression.52 The reasoning was that in most 
cases they could not be aware, by virtue of their position, of aggressive 
intentions of their superiors. Usually, only the top-ranking officers and 
public officials are aware of the aggressive plans of a country.  
1. The ‘Criteria’ for Leadership 
The IMT’s jurisdiction was restricted only to major war criminals and, at 
that point, the Tribunal did not set forth a leadership standard. It was 
accepted also that the non-governmental actors could commit the crime of 
aggression. The Tribunal assumed that individuals who were closely 
connected with the Nazi conspiracy — either by participating directly or 
conniving at the conspiracy and internationally furthered it — should be 
held criminally responsible.53 Only after the High Command case, the crime 
of aggression became close to the one we have today. It transformed from 
the crime of knowledge and participation to the crime of leadership.  
 During the IMT proceedings, in theory, even the least important 
industrialist could be accountable for planning, preparing or initiating 
                                                
50  Art. 8bis(1) ICCSt. 
51  Heller, supra note 17, at 478. 
52  M. Gillett, ‘The Anatomy of an International Crime: Aggression at the International 
Criminal Court’, 3 International Criminal Law Review (2013) 829–864, at 860. 
53  Heller, supra note 17, at 482. 
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aggression if he or she fulfilled the criteria ‘know about the Nazi 
conspiracy’. By the same token, yet ironically, the most important 
industrialist could be held responsible only after his or her membership or 
awareness of the Nazi conspiracy was proved in the court. 54 In the High 
Command case, the Nuremberg Military Tribunal (NMT) maintained for the 
first time that only individuals at the policy level could be accused for the 
crime of aggression: 
When men make a policy that is criminal under international law, 
they are criminally responsible for so doing. This is the logical and 
inescapable conclusion. The acts of commanders and staff officers 
below the policy level, in planning campaigns, preparing means for 
carrying them out, moving against a country on orders and fighting 
a war after it has been instituted, do not constitute the planning, 
preparation, initiation and waging of war or the initiation of 
invasion that international law denounces as criminal55 
The NTM held that the leadership standard of ‘shape or influence’ was 
amounting to individual criminal responsibility: ‘It is not a person’s rank or 
status, but his power to shape or influence the policy of his State, which is 
the relevant issue for determining his criminality under the charge of crimes 
against peace.’56 
 This ‘policy level’ introduced at Nuremberg trials underwent changes 
and the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression opted for 
‘control or direct’ instead of ‘shape or influence’ standard. The new 
requirement is stricter than the former one and the list of potential 
perpetrators is now even more limited. According to Kai Ambos, the 
criterion ‘direct or control’ is justified since it has been proven that during 
the Nuremberg trial and the follow-ups, ‘shape or influence policy’ caused 
almost the same amount of trouble like the ‘major role’ standard, 
consequently leaving too large a group of people exposed, especially in 
democratic societies. 57 One opinion that should be seriously considered is 
that this so-called ‘retreat from Nuremberg’ would give impunity to non-
                                                
54  Ibid., at 486. 
55  High Command case, at 490–491. 
56  Ibid., at 489. 
57  Ambos, supra note 44, at 483–484. 
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political leaders.58 However, it is for the prosecution to adduce evidence in 
court and to prove the level of effective control over aggressive policy for 
non-political actors that will amount to criminal responsibility. Textually, 
there are no legal impediments to prosecute non-political leaders before the 
ICC.  
 In view of the foregoing, one could be prosecuted and ultimately found 
guilty of the crime of aggression only if his real capacity to exercise control 
effectively has been shown; mere de jure power is not sufficient to entail 
individual criminal responsibility. 59 On the whole, political and military 
leaders have this kind of authority and they should be primarily responsible 
when an act of aggression occurs. Amendments to the ICC Statute that were 
introduced at the Kampala Conference do not refer to the level of control 
required, and the overall conclusion is that leadership analysis should be 
conducted on a case-by-case basis. One example of de jure power but without 
actual capacity to exercise ‘control over or to direct the political or military 
action of a state’, is the British queen in relation to the establishment of 
colonial system all over the world.60 If there was a trial, the Queen could not 
be found responsible for the colonization simply because there was no real 
authority towards the military and political establishment in the colonized 
countries.  
 It is clear, however, that the policy level is more stringent at the ICC that 
it was during WWII follow-up trials. Therefore, one cannot rely upon 
NMT’s reasoning in order to drag potential perpetrators into the realm of 
individual criminal responsibility. Accordingly, a new approach is needed in 
order to identify those who fulfill the criterion of ‘control or direct’.  
2. Conceptual Underpinnings of the Leadership Clause 
Conceptual roots of the leadership clause are to be found in the theoretical 
conception of leadership set out by the German sociologist Max Weber.61 
                                                
58  For a broader discussion, see Heller, supra note 17, at 497. 
59  Gillett, supra note 52, at 860. 
60  Ibid. 
61  See N. Weisbord, ‘Conceptualizing Aggression’, 20 ‘Duke Journal of Comparative & 
International Law’ (2009) 1–68, at 44. 
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This theory served as a guiding principle for determination individual 
criminal responsibility for aggression during the post-WWII trials. In Politic 
as Vocation, Weber set forth three ideas of political authority. 62  The 
traditional type of leadership is bound to the idea of the ‘eternal 
yesterday’.63 The patriarch and the patrimonial prince of yore exercised this 
authority.64 People obey them by virtue of tradition. Their power was 
legitimized mainly by religiously sanctified tradition. The second type of 
authority is the charismatic leadership.65 Domination is legitimate because 
the leader has a ‘gift of grace’ or charisma. People obey the leader because 
of his personal qualities such as position in military (military leaders), 
heroism, demagogy etc. For Weber, devotion to the charisma of a leader 
means that people chose to obey him because they believe he is ‘called’ 
leader of men. Finally, there is a type of leadership in which domination is 
legitimized by virtue of legality. 66  This idea of authority is made by 
acceptance of the legal system of a state and ‘functional “competence” 
based on rationally created rules.’ 67  Weber asserted that this type of 
leadership — which in his opinion emerged in modern states at the first half 
of the 20th century — is obeyed in accordance with statutory obligations.  
 The Weberian legal-rational type of leadership was implemented for the 
first time in the London Charter with respect to the definition of aggression. 
The SWGCA used the same principle because it commensurate with the 
bureaucracy that is widely accepted as a means of coordinating the large 
organization, such as state. Thus the wording of Article 8bis ICC statute 
reads: ‘For the purpose of this statute, “crime of aggression” means the 
planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position 
                                                
62  See M. Weber, ‘Politic as Vocation’, H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds), From Max 
Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946) (hereinafter 
‘Politic as Vocation’) available online at 
http://socialpolicy.ucc.ie/Weber_Politics_as_Vocation.htm  [accessed 21 October 
2014], at 77–128. 
63  Ibid. 
64  Ibid. 
65  Ibid. 
66  Ibid. 
67  Ibid. 
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effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military 
action of a state, of an act of aggression…’  
 At this juncture, I want to intersperse two important observations. 
Firstly, the crime of aggression is, according to the Rome Statute, attached 
only to state actors. In international law, a state is a nonphysical juridical 
entity, which has the authority over specific territory and is represented by 
one centralized government.68 Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention 
on the Rights and Duties of States provides that: 
The State as a person of international law should possess the 
following qualifications: 
(a) a permanent population;  
(b) a defined territory; 
(c) government; and 
(d) capacity to enter into relations with other states. 
Today, there are 193 member states within the United Nations system.69 The 
'Montevideo criteria' should be the first recourse in determining the 
statehood of an entity. However, fairly educated international lawyer 
witnessed most creative interpretations from judges in various international 
courts. It would at least not be surprising if the leaders from an entity with 
some characteristics of the statehood, however not with all, will be 
processed before the ICC. Regrettably, further discussion will be purposely 
omitted as this question is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 My observation is that the theory of legal-rational concept of authority is 
employable for the process of identifying leaders of a state before the ICC, 
however, not in the same extent as it was used during the post-WWII trials. 
Weber in his lectures about Politics as Vocation mainly argued about 
dissemination of power within the state organization. Weber saw a state as a 
large bureaucratic organization as we, most likely, see it today. For him the 
main characteristic of a state, which distinguishes it from other forms of 
organizations, is the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within 
state territory. I have purposely used the term 'most likely' since the notion 
                                                
68  See M. Craven, ‘Statehood, Self-Determination and Recognition’, in M.D. Evans (ed.), 
International Law (4th edn., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 201–248. 
69  See Official site of the United Nations, Member Stats of the United Nations, available 
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of state governance underwent changes from the period of the first trials for 
aggression. Nowadays, civil society has more influence on the state policy 
and the motives that define actions of those leaders are different than 
incentives of the state's formal high-officials. Nevertheless, as I stated, this 
theory is applicable to some extent and it can certainly help us to grasp the 
general notion of leadership.  
 The second observation is the political nature of the question of directing 
or controlling state actions that amount to aggression. This remark largely 
hinges on one's perception of the concept of politics. From a sociological 
aspect, the broad definition of politics could be narrowed to the every form 
of independent leadership in action. To that end, whenever there is an 
example of exercise of the authority, the context is always political, 
however with different variations. State organization is a form of a 
leadership concept and the leadership concept is quintessential political 
structure. A state represents relation between different groups in which men 
and women are dominating other men and women, and where leaders 
thereof have the legitimate right to use violence if subordinates do not 
respect their will.70 This idea in a way represents the very essence of a stable 
state organization. Weber held that 
“[p]olitics” for us means striving to share power or striving to 
influence the distribution of power, either among states or among 
groups within a state. This corresponds essentially to ordinary 
usage. When a question is said to be a “political” question, when a 
cabinet minister or an official is said to be a “political” official, or 
when a decision is said to be “politically” determined, what is 
always meant is that interests in the distribution, maintenance, or 
transfer of power are decisive for answering the questions and 
determining the decision or the official's sphere of activity.71 
In a modern state, one who is disturbing the power (e.g. from a position to 
direct or control political and military actions of a state) is actually 
disseminating own political ideas. He strives to impose his will using the 
legal-rational authority that he enjoys among subordinates. Political leaders, 
for instance, use demagogy as means in order to convey their will. 
Demagogy is a political tool that purports political decisions. Military 
                                                
70  See Weber, supra note 62, at 77–128. 
71  Ibid. 
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leaders, as well as politicians, are disseminating political will however with 
different means. What is a war if not an instrument of a state policy 
employed in imposing political will upon confronted political organization, 
such as other states or similar entities? In most cases in modern states, 
military leaders are in the lower position in the state hierarchy than political 
leaders. However, they still have a level of digression in their purview and 
they could meet the requirement of ‘direct or control’ and thus be reliable 
for the crime of aggression. 
 There is an opinion that ponders on the limits of the Weberian theory, 
which indeed commensurate with my conceptual observations. For Noah 
Weisbord, this sociological approach is more state-centric and, inter alia, it 
could not be employed as a guiding principle in determining criminal 
responsibility of leaders of post-bureaucratic organizations, such as 
terroristic organizations.72 As the state is a more vertical organization which 
articulates the clear distinction between superiors and subordinates — a 
notion that represents the nucleus of bureaucracy — organizations such as 
paramilitary ones do not poses that kind of a distinction. Superiors within a 
state are attributed with effective control over their subordinates, which is 
not the case with the post-bureaucratic organizations. Arguably, Weber's 
charismatic type of leadership can be applied as a theoretical approach in 
identifying those power-holders. However, as the crime of aggression from 
the Rome Statute is referring only to the states, regrettably, further 
discussion on this topic will be omitted. Having in mind the incentive of 
states to claim exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute individuals for 
participation in a terroristic or paramilitary organizations — if the crime 
occurred within their national systems — it is highly disputable to what 
extent questions concerning the crime of aggression will be at the table in 
this respect. 
 In the next two chapters I will analyze how the primary sources of law 
engaged the issue of leadership in international criminal law. For scholars at 
least, it is essential to track the roots of this concept in order to understand 
how the state policy is being controlled and directed. Therefore, subsequent 
                                                
72  See Weisbord, supra note 61, at 47. 
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chapter will shed some light on the incentive of international community to 
bring to justice those who were seen as most responsible for carnages during 
WWII. Moreover, the original concept of ‘shape or influence’ will be 
examined together with the reasons for eliding the leadership standard at the 
first international trial for war criminals in modern times.  
 35 
3. First Steps after the World War II 
The international community disputed shortly after WWII whether there 
should be an organized trial for the responsible individuals who caused 
mass atrocities to happen, or, they should be simply hanged as the 
punishment for their deeds. By dint of a few concessions, it was decided 
that everyone who was the alleged perpetrator of crimes during the war 
should face justice before an internationally recognized court, having the 
opportunity to be legally represented.73  
 There were at least two challenges that all the post-war courts were 
facing with respect to the crimes against peace. The first and foremost was 
the challenge to ‘legalize’ the crime itself. This daunting task initially 
appeared as an insurmountable obstacle for the judges, which they 
nevertheless overcome.74 The second — more pertinent to this paper — was 
the establishment of the legal justification that will serve as a notion which 
connects all the accused for aggression, i.e. setting forth the criteria 
common for all the individuals that have been prosecuted for the crimes 
against peace. 
 The Nuremberg International Military Tribunal maintained that lower 
ranking state agents should not be held responsible for the crime of 
aggression. As only the major war criminals were under the purview of the 
London Charter, there was no need for the Tribunal to adopt the leadership 
standard. The IMT held that: ‘Hitler could not make aggressive war by 
himself. He had to have cooperation of statesmen, military leaders, 
diplomats, and businessmen'75 The International Military Tribunal for the 
Far East (IMTFE; the Tokyo Tribunal) followed mainly the path of 
jurisprudence of Nuremberg. The judgment allotted 1079 pages to crimes 
against peace, in comparison with Nurnberg’s 21 pages.76   
                                                
73  See London Charter. 
74  For the criticism of Nuremberg Judgment see Weigend, supra note 7. 
75  IMT Judgment, at 223. 
76  United States et al. v. Araki et al., The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, 4 November 1948, 
(hereinafter the ‘IMTFE Judgment’). 
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 Soon after the IMT delivered its judgment the Allied Powers enacted 
Control Council Law No. 10 (Law No. 10)77 in order to empower the 
occupying authority in each of the zones of occupation to establish military 
tribunals to prosecute offenders for crimes committed during the war. The 
High Command case 78  and Ministries case 79  addressed the issue of 
leadership in a more detailed manner, adopting for the first time the policy 
level requirement that should capture the common characteristics of 
individuals who were most responsible for commencing the war. 
 This chapter will analyze the leadership standard ('shape or influence') 
that permeates through the trials at the immediate aftermath of WWII. 
Although the leadership clause is explicitly stated only in some cases and 
not in others, it is highly evident that there are some similar characteristics 
of the defendants that make them suitable to be held responsible for the 
crime of aggression. Moving forward chronologically with the argument, 
chapter after the next one will attempt to decipher the ‘direct or control’ 
concept that is employed at the ICC, and thus open a door for a theoretical 
contemplation.   
A. The Nuremberg International Military Tribunal 
The IMT did not spell out the specific criteria for determining who are the 
individuals that should be held responsible for the crimes against peace. 
Instead, the court went on analyzing each and every accused for his 
participation and hierarchy level, concluding that he did participate or did 
not participate in aggression. Nevertheless, there are some traces indicating 
how the tribunal determined who are the leaders most responsible for the 
aggression. 
 To embark upon the analysis, in order to understand what was the 
guiding principle for prosecuting individuals, it is essential to begin with an 
                                                
77  Allied Control Council Law No. 10, 20 Dec. 1945, 15 Trials of War Criminals Before 
the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10 (1951), 23–28 
(hereinafter Law No. 10). 
78  See High Command case. 
79  See U.S. v. von Weizsäcker et al., in Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg 
Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Nuremberg, October 1946 – 
April 1949, Vol. XIV (1949) (hereinafter the ‘Ministries case’).  
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examination of the reasons for the absence of leadership clause. First of all, 
the Tribunal was, according to the London Charter, founded for the purpose 
of trying the major criminals of the European Axis whose crimes had no 
particular geographical location. The expression ‘major’ is again mentioned 
in the London Charter under the section III, with the title: ‘Committee for 
the Investigation and Prosecution of Major War Criminals.’ It was clear 
then that at the first trial after WWII only the top ranking German leaders 
would be prosecuted and adopting any sort of policy requirement would be 
superfluous. The second reason for eliding the leadership clause is the fact 
that the trial conducted in Nuremberg was the first international trial in 
respect of the crime of aggression. The judges, the prosecution, and 
everyone else participating in this historic enterprise did not anticipate the 
need for having a set of criteria that will guide both the trial and prosecution 
chamber in determining criminal liability. However, this ‘blunder’ did not 
diminish the significance of the trial as the goal was ultimately reached — 
most responsible men were convicted. 
 There are two counts of the indictment referring to aggression. Count 
one charges the defendants with conspiring or having a common plan to 
commit crimes against peace; count two charges the accused for committing 
specific crimes against peace by planning, preparing, initiating, and waging 
wars of aggression against a number of other states.80 The court considered 
both counts together in order to illuminate the importance of Hitler’s 
associates in crafting a common plan and waging a war. Among the 22 for 
whom a judgment was rendered, eight defendants were convicted of both 
counts and four of count two only. The analysis below shows that the 
Tribunal did not have a clear standard according to which it determine 
individual criminal responsibility. It is perhaps convenient to present on this 
point, without disputing the facts of the case, the court’s step-by-step 
reasoning why this specific group of people was found guilty for the crimes 
against peace. 
                                                
80  IMT Judgment, at 421. 
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 The defendant Göring81 was convicted of counts one and two because of 
his close relationship with Hitler. He had high-level position both in the 
Nazi Party and the Government. The Tribunal argued that he possessed 
knowledge of the aggressive plans and he participated in the acts of 
aggression and aggressive war. The IMT held that he was: ‘the planner and 
prime mover in the military and diplomatic preparation for war which 
Germany pursued.’82 
 The defendant Hess83 was found guilty of counts one and two of the 
indictment. He was a deputy to Hitler and he was a top man in the Nazi 
party, with the primary responsibility to handle all party matters acting in 
Hitler’s name on all question of leadership. The Tribunal maintained that he 
had knowledge of the aggressive plans and he participated in the aggressive 
war.84 
 The defendant von Ribbentrop85 was found guilty of counts one and two 
of the indictment after the Nuremberg Tribunal considered his relationship 
with Hitler and his high-level positions in the Government. The Nuremberg 
Tribunal held that he was in possession of knowledge of the aggressive 
plans and he participated in the acts of aggression and aggressive war.86 
 The defendant Keitel87 was convinced of counts one and two because it 
was proven that he had knowledge of the aggressive plans and that he 
                                                
81  Göring was Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe and Plenipotentiary for the Four-
Year Plan. 
82  IMT Judgment, at 485–486. 
83  Hess joined the Nazi Party in 1920. He was imprisoned with Hitler in the Landsberg 
fortress in 1924 and became Hitler’s closest personal confidant. On 21 April 1933, he 
was appointed Deputy to the Führer, and on 1 December 1933 he was made Reich 
Minister without Portfolio. On 4 February 1938, he was appointed member of the 
Secret Cabinet Council and a member of the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the 
Reich. 
84  IMT Judgment, at 487–488. 
85  Ribbentrop joined Nazi Party in 1932. He has been made as Foreign Policy Adviser to 
Hitler and representative of the Nazi Party on foreign policy in 1933. He was appointed 
Delegate for Disarmament Questions and in 1935 Minister Plenipotentiary at Large. In 
1936 he was appointed Ambassador to England. In 1938 he succeeded von Neurath as 
Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
86  IMT Judgment, at 489–490. 
87 Keitel was Chief of Staff to the Minister of War. In 1938 he became Chief of the High 
Command of the Armed Forces. 
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participated in the acts of aggression and aggressive war, base on his high-
level position in the military.88 
 Considering the four other accused that have been convicted of counts 
one and two of the indictment (Rosenberg,89  Raeder,90  Jodl91  and von 
Neurath92), the IMT based its reasoning on the same three criteria as it did 
for four above: high-level position, possession of knowledge of the 
aggressive plans and the participation in the acts of aggression and 
aggressive war.93  
 The Nuremberg Tribunal directed a verdict of acquittal on count one for 
the four defendants (Frick 94 , Funk 95 , Dönitz 96 , Seyss-Inquart 97 ) and 
convicted them on count two of the indictment. The court held that they all 
had the knowledge of the aggressive plans and they all participated in the 
acts of aggression and aggressive war, the same as the eight accused who 
                                                
88 IMT Judgment, at 491–492. 
89  Rosenberg joined the Nazi Party in 1919. He was recognized as the Party’s ideologist 
and he developed and spread Nazi doctrines in the newspapers Völkischer Beobachter 
and NS Monatshefte, which he edited. 
90  Raeder became Chief of Naval Command in 1928. In 1039, Hitler made him Gross-
Admiral. He was a member of the Reich Defense Council. In 1943 he stepped down 
and became Admiral Inspector of the Navy, a nominal title. 
91  Jodl was Chief of the National Defense Section in the High Command from 1935 to 
1938. In 1939 he become Chief of the Operations Staff of the High Command of the 
Armed Forces. His superior was Keitel, but he reported directly to Hitler on operational 
matters. 
92  Von Neurath was a professional diplomat who served as German Ambassador to Great 
Britain from 1930 to 1932. In 1932 he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. Ha 
has been made Reich Minister without Portfolio, President of the Secret Cabinet 
Council and a member of the Reich Defense Council on 4 February 1938. From 1939 
to 1041 he was appointed Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia. 
93  IMT Judgment, at 495–524. 
94  Frick was recognized as the chief Nazi administrative specialist and bureaucrat. He was 
appointed Reichminister of the Hitler’s first Cabinet. Among all positions that he 
obtained, he was Reich Director of Elections, General Plenipotentiary for the 
Administration of the Reich and a member of the ‘Three-Man Council.’ 
95  Funk joined the Nazi Party in 1931 and shortly after became one of Hitler’s personal 
economic advisers. He took office as Minister of Economics and Plenipotentiary 
General for War Economy in 1938, and  as President of the Reichsbank in 1939. 
96  Dönitz took command of the first U-boat flotilla in 1935. In 1943 he was appointed 
Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy. In 1945 he became the Head of State, 
succeeding Hitler. 
97  Seyss-Inquart was Austrian attorney who was appointed State Councilor in Austria in 
1937. He officially joined Nazi Party in 1938. He was appointed Austrian Minister of 
Security and Interior with control over the police. 
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were found guilty of both counts.98 Except for Seyss-Inquart, where the 
Tribunal omitted to elucidate the reasons why he was acquitted of count 
one, the rest of defendants were exonerated because they lacked in 
knowledge about the common plan. Frick was exonerated after court’s 
findings that he was not a member of a common plan or conspiracy to wage 
aggressive war because he was not present during the conferences at which 
Hitler outlined his aggressive plans. Funk was acquitted of count one 
because he had become an active participant in aggressive war only after the 
aggressive plans were defined.99 The defendant Dönitz was acquitted of 
count one because it was not proven that he possessed knowledge about the 
plans to wage aggressive war and he had not been privy to the conspiracy.100 
 The structure of the Tribunal’s judgment shows that the court did not set 
out the leadership standard explicitly. There are no strict criteria that have 
been followed in the assessment of the participation in crimes against peace 
of each accused. However, if one glimpses for a second the analysis 
provided above, he will most likely notice that there are indeed some 
guidance in the judgment that the Tribunal was following through its 
reasoning. Expressions like ‘knowledge of the aggressive plans’ and ‘high-
level position’, give us a clue that this judgment actually has paved the way 
for the leadership clause that we have today. Further to this statement is the 
fact that the Tribunal emphasized the importance of de facto authority, 
rather than de jure power. For instance, the IMT validate the importance of 
Dönitz’s position, his leadership role, decision-making authority and his 
significant contribution to waging aggressive war rather that his title.101  
 If we take a closer look at the reasoning of the court, we are likely to 
notice that for each defendant who was convicted for crimes against peace, 
regardless of count one or two, the Tribunal found that he was in possession 
of knowledge of the aggressive plans and he participated in the acts of 
aggression and aggressive war. Every one of them was, in the court’s own 
wording, in high-level position whether in the Nazi Party, the Government 
                                                
98  IMT Judgment, at 499–521. 
99  Ibid., at 502–503. 
100  Ibid. at 507. 
101  Ibid. 
 41 
or in the military. Furthermore, disputably, the first signpost for the Tribunal 
was the close relationship with Hitler in determining who were the leaders 
most responsible for the aggression. For instance, the IMT held that Göring, 
Hess and Ribbentrop had the influence on German aggressive policy 
because they were close to Hitler.  
 There is another test that has been conducted in assessing who were the 
leaders responsible for planning the aggression, which was applied in 
assessing the responsibility on count one of the indictment. The Tribunal 
stated: 
Evidence from captured documents has revealed that Hitler held 
four secret meetings, to which the Tribunal proposes to make 
special reference, because of the light they shed upon the question 
of the common plan and aggressive war. These meetings took place 
on 5th November 1937, 23rd May 1939, 22nd August 1939, and 
23rd November 1939. At these meetings important declarations 
were made by Hitler as to his purposes, which are quite 
unmistakable in their terms.102 
We can conclude from this reasoning that the attendance at these four 
meetings was somewhat of a telltale for the IMT of who were the “founding 
fathers” of the common plan for waging the war.   
 Although the Nuremberg Tribunal did not adopt the leadership clause, it 
had some principles that it followed in proving the leadership positions. As I 
endeavored to elucidate, there are at least three tests that served the court in 
determining individual criminal responsibility for the aggression. This was 
the first international trial for the crime of aggression and the first 
international trial ever. Situation has changed considerably in the following 
trials, since the leadership clause emerged as an intrinsic part of the crime of 
aggression. 
B. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
The Tokyo Tribunal was founded so that the major war criminals in the Far 
East could face the trial for offences committed during WWII.103 Whereas 
                                                
102  Ibid., at 423. 
103  Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Trial of Japanese War 
Criminals: Documents, p. 39, Department of State Publication No. 2613, United States 
Government Printing Office, 1946 (hereinafter the ‘Tokyo Charter’). 
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the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was established pursuant 
to an agreement, the IMTFE foundation was based on the Special 
Proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the 
Allied Powers. The Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East (the Tokyo Charter) envisaged the crimes against peace as one of the 
core crimes: 
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual 
responsibility: 
Crimes against Peace: Namely, the planning, preparation, initiation 
or waging of a declared or undeclared war of aggression, or a war 
in violation of international law, treaties, agreements or assurances, 
or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the 
accomplishment of any of the foregoing.104 
In comparison with the Nuremberg Tribunal, the IMTFE Judgment (the 
Tokyo Judgment)105 allotted about 70% of the whole to the crimes against 
peace, and the rest was devoted to the war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. 106 What remained disputable for many more years after the trial 
is the fact that Allies decided not to prosecute Emperor Hirohito. If Hitler 
did not commit suicide on 30 April 1945, there would be no question of his 
exposure in Nuremberg. The Allies held that Emperor Hirohito had a rather 
symbolic role in shaping the aggressive politic in Japan. 107 
 The indictment lodged on 29 April 1946 encompassed three groups of 
charges against 28 accused and 55 counts were devoted to aggression.108 For 
the purpose of this thesis, the most important is group one that contains 
counts 1 to 36 and it concerns the crimes against peace. Counts 1 to 5 
addressed the common plan or conspiracy to commit crimes against peace; 
counts 6 to 17 addressed the planning and preparation of wars of aggression; 
                                                
104  Art. 5(2)(a) Tokyo Charter. 
105  See IMTFE Judgment. 
106  Sayapin, supra note 45, at 179. 
107  Ibid. 
108  IMTFE Judgment, at 48,447–48,453. 
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counts 18 to 26 addressed the initiation of wars of aggression; and counts 27 
to 36 addressed the waging of wars of aggression.109  
 The IMTFE considered the individual criminal liability of the 25 
defendants and all of them were found guilty of the crimes against peace. As 
its predecessor in Nuremberg, the Tokyo Tribunal failed to define the 
leadership standard. Though it devoted an immense part of its judgment to 
the aggression, the court did not set out the standard that would bring closer 
to understanding individual criminal responsibility of the individuals. 
However, by analyzing the judgment we may conclude that there are some 
principles that were followed in determining leadership positions of the 
accused. 
 Sadao Araki110 was convicted of counts 1 and 27 after the Tokyo 
Tribunal found that he was one of the leaders of the conspiracy and 
participated in waging aggressive war. The court based its reasoning on his 
prominent position both in military (he was a high-ranking officer, General) 
and the government. 111  Kenji Dohihara112 was convicted of crimes against 
peace, after the court found that he was one of the leaders who were 
involved in aggressive plans and polices. He was Colonel and General in the 
Japanese Army. 113  The Tokyo Tribunal maintained that the defendant 
Kiichiro Hiranuma114 was guilty of crimes against peace after it found that 
he was a leader since he assumed high-level positions in the government. 115 
The accused Koki Hirota116 was found guilty of aggression because he 
participated in the common plan or conspiracy to wage aggressive wars as a 
                                                
109  Ibid. 
110  Araki was recognized as one of the prominent leaders of the Army movement. He 
assumed office as Minister of War in December 1931. He was Minister of Education 
from 1938 to 1939. 
111  IMTFE Judgment, at 49,774–49,776. 
112  Dohihara was a Colonel in the Japanese army and by April 1941 he had attained the 
rank of General. 
113  IMTFE Judgment, at 49,777–49,779. 
114  Hiranuma was a President of the Privy Council from 1936 until 1939, when he became 
Prime Minister. Later, he was the Minister Without Portfolio and Home Minister in the 
Second and third Konoye Cabinets. 
115  IMTFE Judgment, at 49,786–49,787. 
116  Hirota was Foreign Minister between 1933 and 1936 when he became Prime Minister. 
In 1937 he again assumed office as Foreign Minister in the First Konoye Cabinet.  
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Foreign Minister. During his tenure of office in the Government, the court 
found that he occupied high-level position and that he was a 'forceful 
leader'.117 
 By way of example, the Tokyo Tribunal followed the same pattern in 
determining their criminal liability. Undoubtedly, there was a nexus 
between their leadership positions and the criminal responsibility for crimes 
against peace. There are two more defendants that are certainly worth 
examining, because the reasoning of the IMTFE in their case is somewhat 
different. 
  For the defendant Kenryo Sato118 the Tokyo Tribunal considered two 
important prerequisites in order for one to be held responsible for common 
plan or conspiracy to commit crimes against peace. 119 The court stated: 
It was thus not until 1941 that Sato attained a position which by 
itself enabled him to influence the making of policy, and no 
evidence has been adduced that prior to that date he had indulged in 
plotting to influence the making of policy. The crucial question is 
whether by that date he had become aware that Japan's designs 
were criminal, for thereafter he furthered the development and 
execution of those designs so far as he was able.120 
In the next few passages the court maintained that the answer to this 
question is positive and it is beyond any doubt as Sato delivered a speech in 
August 1938, where he has shown complete familiarity with the aggressive 
plans of Japan. As we can see, the criteria for the leadership in Sato’s case 
was the possibility to influence the making of aggressive policy of Japan. 
The second criterion, which relates to the leadership standard in general, is 
the knowledge of the aggressive policy and the development and execution 
of those designs by the accused.  
                                                
117 IMTFE Judgment, at 49,788–49,792. 
118  Sato was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in 1937. He was ‘explainer’ in the 
General Mobilization Law to the Diet. In 1941 he was appointed Chief of the Military 
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 The reasons for Heitaro Kimura’s121 criminal responsibility are by far 
the most intriguing part of the Tokyo Judgment. The IMTFE convicted him 
of crimes against peace, even though the Tribunal stated that he was not a 
leader. By the court’s findings, Heitaro was a valuable accomplice in the 
conspiracy to wage aggressive wars, as he was Vice-Minister of War. 
Although he was not a leader, he possessed knowledge of the Government’s 
plans and preparations for the Pacific War and hostilities in China. He 
contributed to the aggressive policy by giving advice based on his wide 
experience, and developing and formulating aggressive plans which he 
initiated. 122 Notwithstanding the fact that he was not a high-level officer, the 
court found that his contribution was crucial and sufficient, which entailed 
his criminal liability in respect of crimes against peace.  
 As we can see by the wording of the IMTFE, determination of the 
leadership positions was the crucial point in substantiating the liability for 
crimes against peace. There is only one exception — the defendant Hitaro. 
For most of the accused, the Tokyo Tribunal considered their leadership 
position in the virtue of their position. Some of them were prominent 
military officers and others were high-level Government officials. During 
their incumbency they shaped the aggressive policy of Japan. In Sato’s case, 
the court directed his criminal liability in virtue of his position from which 
he was enabled to influence the making of aggressive policy. This was most 
certainly one of the indicators for future international trials, where the courts 
were struggling to define the leadership component of the accused in respect 
to the crimes against peace. 
C. Nuremberg Military Tribunal 
Only a couple of months after the IMT rendered its judgment, the Allied 
Powers issued Law No. 10 authorizing the occupying authority in each of 
the zones of occupation to establish tribunals in order to prosecute war 
                                                
121  Kimura became Vice-Minister of War in 1941. He was appointed Councilor of the 
Planning Board and Councilor of the Total War Research Institute. In 1944 he became 
Commander0in0Chief of the Burma Area Army which post he held until the surrender 
of Japan in 1945. 
122  IMTFE Judgment, at 49,807–49,810. 
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criminals and other similar offenders that were left out by the Nuremberg 
judgment. For the American zone in Germany, the United States founded 
military tribunals pursuant to the foregoing law. There were 12 trials in the 
period between 1946 and 1949. Only on four of these cases defendants were 
prosecuted of crimes against peace. 123  
 For the purpose of this thesis, it is rather unnecessary to discuss in any 
detail those cases except for the High Command case. It is the only trial 
where the court took into consideration the leadership clause and tackled the 
related issues giving substantive explanations. In the Ministries case, the 
Nuremberg Military Tribunal accepted the leadership standard that has been 
previously established in the High Command case. 
 In the High Command case, 14 officers with high positions in the 
German military were prosecuted for aggression.124 This was the first trial 
for crimes committed during WWII where the court addressed the issue of 
leadership in a more detailed manner, under the section ‘Count One of the 
Indictment — Aggressive War’. 125  The NMT spelled out criteria for 
assessing criminal liability in respect of crimes against peace by centralizing 
leadership position as an intrinsic part, without which one could not be held 
responsible: 
There first must be actual knowledge that an aggressive war is 
intended and that if launched it will be an aggressive war. But mere 
knowledge is not sufficient to make participation even by high 
ranking military officers in the war criminal. It requires in addition 
that the possessor of such knowledge, after he acquires it shall be in 
a position to shape or influence the policy that brings about its 
initiation or it continuance after initiation, either by furthering, or 
by hindering or preventing it. If he then does the former, he 
becomes criminally responsible; if he does the latter to the extent of 
his ability, then his action shows the lack of criminal intent with 
respect to such policy.126 
As we can see, the court maintained that mere knowledge of an aggressive 
war does not entail criminal liability if an accused is not in a position to 
shape or influence the policy that brings about its initiation. Moreover, the 
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court held that what counts is one’s de facto power to shape or influence the 
policy of a state; mere rank or status should serve only as an indication, not 
as a conclusive evidence.127 Furthermore, there could be a situation where a 
leader was not in a possession of knowledge that the planning and 
preparation for invasion and wars were not in violation with international 
law.128 In that case, a defendant who lacked such knowledge cannot be 
guilty of an offence.129  
 The NMT made a clear distinction between the persons with leadership 
characteristics and common foot soldiers. Individuals on the lower level of 
the state policy often serve as instruments of high-level state officials who 
are in position to shape or influence aggressive policy. 130  As the Tribunal 
stated, 
[i]nternational law condemns those who, due to their actual power 
to shape and influence the policy of their nation, prepare for, or lead 
their country into or in an aggressive war. But we do not find that, 
at the present stage of development, international law declares as 
criminals those below that level who, in the execution of this war 
policy, act as the instruments of the policy makers. Anybody who is 
on the policy level and participates in the war policy is liable to 
punishment. But those under them cannot be punished for the 
crimes of others. The misdeed of the policy makers is all the greater 
in as much as they use the great mass of the soldiers and officers to 
carry out an international crime; however, the individual soldier or 
officer below the policy level is but the policy makers' instrument, 
finding himself, as he does, under the rigid discipline which is 
necessary for and peculiar to military organization.131 
On the other hand, the court made an important distinction between 
commanders and leaders. Not every commander is a leader; what matters 
most is the policy level, which I analyzed earlier in the light of the ‘shape or 
influence’ standard. The act of those commanders that could be interpreted 
as planning, preparing, giving orders and fighting a war, do not amount to 
those one that have been prescribed in count one of the indictment.132 
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129  Ibid. 
130  Historical Review, at 92. 
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 What I find interesting and unusual for all the international trials in the 
aftermath of WWII is the court’s reasoning related to the question of 
morality of a leader that is closely connected with the respect for human 
rights. The NMT stated that ‘it would have been eminently desirable had the 
commanders of the German armed forces refused to implement the policy of 
the Third Reich by means of aggressive war … had they done so, they 
would have served their fatherland and humanity also.’ 133 The court is 
insinuating that individual in a leadership position should have borne in 
mind that the question of legality is not the same as the question of 
legitimacy with respect to human rights, viz. though the orders were legally 
given by the state’s authority, no one has the legitimacy to direct actions 
towards encroachment of a human dignity, not even a democratic elected 
government. A high-level officer should have had affinity to disobey those 
orders, as most probably, this kind of affinity brought him to that position. 
Everyone who did not act with such due diligence should be held 
responsible and for this reason the objection of following orders does not 
stands. This reasoning might be used as guidance in future trials for crime of 
aggression in the process of identifying one's individual criminal 
responsibility. 
 To sum up, in the High Command case, the NMT set out the three-limb 
test in the pursuit of criminal responsibility of crimes against peace. 134 First 
of all, the perpetrator must have the knowledge that an aggressive war is 
intended, which is illegal according to the norms of international law and 
treaties. Secondly, mere knowledge is insufficient and only a person in a 
position to shape or influence the aggressive policy of a state could be liable 
for the crime. Finally, a perpetrator must have taken some actions in 
furtherance of the aggressive policy. 
                                                
133  Ibid., at 488. 
134  Heller, supra note 17, at 486. 
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4. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
At the final stage of 1998 Rome Conference there has not been a universally 
accepted definition on the crime of aggression. It was unquestionable that 
the crime of aggression would fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC, but the 
opinions were segregated concerning the details of the crime. The 
differences were mainly oriented around the definition itself and the 
procedural facet of the crime.135 As the Rome Conference came to a close, 
members of the Non-Aligned Movement proposed a seemingly workable 
solution.136 Aggression was included in the purview of the International 
Criminal Court, but the definition and certain conditions for the exercise of 
jurisdiction were left out. The outcome was the adoption of Article 5 ICC 
Statute, which reads 
Article 5  
Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court 
1. The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole. The 
Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this Statute with respect 
to the following crimes: 
(a) The crime of genocide; 
(b) Crimes against humanity; 
(c) War crimes; 
(d) The crime of aggression. 
2. The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression 
once a provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 
defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the 
Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a 
provision shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the 
Charter of the United Nations. 
The Rome Statute entered into force on 1 July 2002 and it was up to the 
future review conference to find a closure to this issue, which would be held 
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not before 1 July 2009137 By Resolution F of the Final Act of the United 
Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries of an International 
Criminal Court, the Preparatory Commission for the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court was founded with a primary task to define the 
crime of aggression.138  
 The Preparatory Commission made the first concrete step at its third 
session, establishing the Working Group on Aggression directed by the 
judges of the ICC. There was no real significant contribution made by this 
group, other than a summary of the main positions towards the crime of 
aggression that have been encompassed in the Coordinator’s Discussion 
Paper of 11 July 2002139 The Assembly of States Parties (ASP)140 made the 
second step and created the Special Working Group on the Crime of 
Aggression.141 Spanning from 2003 to the turn of 2009, SWGCA met 
several times and finally in 2009 made a proposal for the definition of the 
crime of aggression, which ultimately has been adopted in Kampala 
Conference.  
 This chapter provides, indeed remotely, the insight on how the SWGCA 
interspersed the leadership clause and what was the incentive to avoid the 
Nuremberg standard ‘shape or influence’. In the second part it strives to 
decipher the meaning of both components 'direct' and 'control' in terms of 
contemporary international law understandings. 
A. Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression 
Guided by the jurisprudence of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, the 
SWGCA reaffirmed in its earliest papers that the crime of aggression is 
'reserved' only for high-ranking state officials. Persons who are unable to 
‘influence the policy of carrying out the crime’ should be excluded from 
                                                
137  Arts 5(2), 121, 123 ICCSt. 
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139  UN Doc. PCNICC/2002/WGCA/RT.1/Rev.2. 
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2002, ICC-ASP/I/3, 328. 
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criminal responsibility.142 In another key, by the virtue of their position, 
lower ranking state agents cannot be aware of aggressive plans. Since they 
do not posses the cognitive segment of mental element — the awareness — 
they could not be liable for the crime of aggression. This observation most 
likely satisfied most of the international lawyers who took into review the 
work of SWGCA.  
 In its earliest stage, the SWGCA confronted two different approaches 
concerning the scope of the leadership concept. The main question at the 
table was: which levels of power constitute the leadership circle? On the one 
hand, there was an opinion advocating that all persons who are in a position 
to exert decisive influence over the policies of the state ought be criminally 
reliable.143 That would include more than a top-ranking decision makers, 
such as social, business and spiritual leaders. On the other hand, it was 
suggested that the scope of leadership should be understood more 
restrictively, narrowed to only the high-ranking state officials, excluding for 
instance legal advisers who could not obtain effective control over state’s 
military actions. 144  The argument against the latter proposal was that 
inserting such standard it would be rather difficult to prove the criminal 
liability of persons outside of the circle of direct leaders.145  
 The SWGCA took into consideration both facets and strived to find a 
solution that would be satisfactory to both the international experts and 
states, which are the ultimate subject that should decide whether the 
definition is acceptable or not. The upshot was a leadership clause that 
remained true to the Nuremberg precedent, however slightly modified due 
to the arguments that could not be neglected. Only the high-ranking state 
officials were considered as ‘leaders’, thus, the ‘shape or influence’ standard 
from the High Command case was supplanted with ‘direct or control’.146  
                                                
142  ICC-ASP/4/SWGCA/INF.1, § 19. 
143  ICC-ASP/3/SWGCA/INF.1, § 49. 
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146  Art. 8bis(1) ICCSt. 
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B. The ‘Control or Direct’ Standard 
The roots of the terms ‘direct’ and ‘control’ can be found in the Articles on 
State Responsibility. Article 17 reads 
Direction and control exercised over the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act 
A state which directs and controls another state in the commission 
of an internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally 
responsible for that act if: 
(a) that state does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the 
internationally wrongful act; and 
(b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that 
State.147 
In 2008, the International Law Commission offered interpretation of the 
terms and articles on State Responsibility.148 As they noticed, the term 
‘controls’ coincides with ‘domination over the commission … and not 
simply the exercise of oversight, still less mere influence or concern.’ 149 
The term ‘direct’ is not mere incitement or suggestion, ‘but rather connotes 
actual direction of an operative kind.’150  
 Before I embark upon the analysis of the terms, I find it rather 
convenient to make a short caveat at this juncture. ‘Effective control’ is the 
concept that served the International Court of Justice in 1986, as an 
instrument in assessing the United States’ accountability for acts carried out 
by Contra guerillas in Nicaragua.151 That said, the legal document from 
which ‘effective control’ standard derives is somewhat inadequate to be 
applied here since it is not related to the conduct of individuals but rather to 
states. This notwithstanding, it could yet be useful, to some extent indeed, in 
interpreting the standard that constitutes leadership in the crime of 
                                                
147  Art. 17 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
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aggression. The ICJ held that: ‘at least at one period, (Contra forces) been 
so dependent on the United States that it could not conduct its crucial or 
most significant military and paramilitary activities without the multi-
faceted support of the United States.’152 In this case the relationship between 
Contra forces and the U.S. Government was tested. The finding of the Court 
was that the U.S. Government had effective control over the Contra forces 
because the Contras were ‘so dependent’ that without the U.S. they could 
not carry out their conducts. On the other hand, when it comes to the 
definition of the crime of aggression, the relationship between potential 
offender (individual) and state policy is at stake. If we use the interpretation 
given by the ICJ, we might come to the following conclusion: if the role of 
individual was so crucial in committing the acts of aggression, and without 
such role those acts would not occur, than that person is in a position of 
effective control over the political or military action of a state.  
 In assessing the leadership standard that has been put forward by the 
SWGCA, one can notice that both ‘direct’ and ‘control’ encompass the 
factual power over state conduct. Mere influence of a person who is in a 
position of leadership would not entail individual criminal responsibility. 
The term ‘control’ should serve as a criterion for capturing persons into the 
ambit of criminal liability, without whose participation state action that 
amounts to act of aggression would not be committed. This conclusion was 
drawn from the ICJ's interpretation elaborated afore. On the other hand, 
‘direct’ alternative of the leadership clause should exclude persons who are 
in a position to influence the decision-makers, however without actual 
power towards the state policy. Likewise the International Law Commission 
stated: ‘the word “directs” does not encompass mere incitement or 
suggestion but rather connotes actual direction of an operative kind’,153 it 
should be understood that assistants, advisers, best friends or spouses of the 
high-ranking state officials, could not be found guilty for the crime of 
aggression. In all probability, a leader who merely directs political or 
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military policy of a state will not be on such a high level in the state 
leadership as a person who is in a position to 'control' it.  
C. New v. Old — ‘Pro et Contra’  
Article 8bis of the ICC Statute stipulates individual criminal responsibility 
for the crime of aggression. The long-awaited definition is constructed in 
three parts with at least two novelties in comparison with its customary 
counterpart. The new leadership clause, which represents one of those 
novelties, asserts that if a person is not in a position to direct or control state 
policy, he cannot be held responsible for aggression though his conducts 
were unlawful (actus reus) and if he had the necessary intent and knowledge 
(mens rea) required in this respect. There is a stark difference between the 
ICC standard and the one from the WWII follow-up trials, i.e. ‘shape or 
influence’ standard was broader and persons that were fulfilling this criteria 
could not suffice for ‘direct or control’. Many scholars advocated the latter 
concept as the more appropriate one, since — according to some of them — 
in those terms the commitment of the crime of aggression will entail 
criminal responsibility only if the perpetrators were in positions of political 
or military leadership and organized or planned aggression.154 Perpetrators 
for the crime of aggression could be only those who have decision-making 
power on behalf of a state.155 Accordingly, low-level political, low-ranked 
military officials and people acting in a private capacity should be excluded 
from criminal liability.  
 The practical implications of interpretation set out above favor the 
‘control or direct’ standard over the ‘shape or influence’. In reality, there are 
people who could influence the state policy, and maybe even shape it, but 
they are not directly involved in the governmental apparatus. According to 
the German historian Heike B. Görtemaker, Eva Braun was the central 
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figure in Adolf Hitler’s private life.156 He dreamed to live with her in Linz 
after the war is over and to pass on the leadership position to a new younger 
man. She gradually garnered power within Hitler’s inner circle, though her 
identity was kept as a secret for most of the WWII period. Görtemaker did 
not have any doubt that Braun knew about Hitler’s plans to invade Poland, 
for instance. Taking into account the nature of their relationship, one might 
consider the influence of Eva Braun upon Hitler according to which she 
presumably have had shaped or influenced policy of the Third Reich. In that 
manner, if she lived through the post-war trials, she could be prosecuted 
because she fulfilled the ‘shape or influence’ criteria. 
 There goes another argument for the ‘control or direct’ concept. It is 
abundantly clear that this concept is stringent than the one from the High 
Command case. As I endeavored to present, broadness of the ‘shape or 
influence’ formulation renders various difficulties. Spanning from the 
difficulties to prove the role of individuals outside of the decision-making 
circle on the one side, to having a too wide concept pursuant to which 
numerous people would be subjected to criminal liability on the other. 
Nevertheless, there is one persuasive argument against the ‘direct or control’ 
standard that has to be borne in mind while praising disappearance of all the 
shortcomings that were embedded in the ‘shape or influence’ concept. 
According to Heller, private economic actors and third-state officials could 
never suffice for the ‘control or direct’ standard.157 Contrary to this view, I 
must say that I am more inclined towards other lawyers who argued that by 
adopting the ‘direct or control’ requirement — as a nucleus of the leadership 
concept — the definition would also capture leaders who do not occupy any 
formal position but who are able to control political or military action of a 
state by informal means. To this end, economic and religious leaders could 
be held responsible for aggression.158  
 Notwithstanding previously said about the ‘control or direct’ standard, 
the clear mechanism is lacking in the process of identifying leaders of a 
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state in terms of international criminal law. As the analysis above 
implicates, different approach should be adopted than the one from the post-
WWII trials. ‘Direct or control’ standard is for the first time employed in 
international criminal law and there is no judicial practice in this respect — 
national or international — that will lead the ICC towards identifying 
leadership circle. Both terms 'direct' and 'control' do not have normative 
content within international criminal law. 
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5. Final Remarks 
Criminal law was brought to the international level for the first time during 
post-WWII trials. The ‘crimes against peace’, today’s crime of aggression, 
was regarded as a ‘supreme crime’— the crime that triggers mass carnages 
which occur during the warfare. During that time, the individuals that were 
seen most responsible for commencing a war were in the focus of the 
proceedings. Justice Robert Jackson asserted that most responsible persons 
are those who are standing at the highest level in a state’s chain of 
command. There is not much doubt that the crime of aggression from that 
moment and on was ‘reserved’ only for the top-ranking state agents. The 
leadership clause indeed serves to that cause. It reflects on individual 
criminal responsibility by way of putting it in a different context; i.e. only a 
person that is regarded as a state leader, according to this standard, could be 
found responsible for the crime of aggression. Hence, the main incentive of 
having such clause is to narrow down the scope of potential perpetrators as 
only a small, well-coordinated group has the authority to drag the state into 
a war.  
 At the first trial in Nuremberg, the IMT did not specify what criteria was 
needed to be fulfilled in order for one to be considered as a leader of the 
state. Instead, the court analyzed separately actions of an every accused and 
founding guilty those who had a nexus with the aggressive plans. All of the 
accused that were convicted for aggression were in a high position whether 
in the Nazi Party, the Government or in the military. Close relationship with 
Hitler seemed to be a first indication for the IMT of who are the 
perpetrators. This, however, was only the first recourse. The possession of 
knowledge of aggressive plans was inevitable feature for all convicted in 
this respect. In spite of not having a clear standard, the IMT unequivocally 
set out that only a person from a leadership circle could be found liable for 
aggression.  
 In the Tokyo trial, the IMTFE followed the path of jurisprudence 
established before the IMT. Again, there were no specific leadership criteria 
that — when fulfilled — would entail individual criminal responsibility for 
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aggression. However, determining the leadership role in the state apparatus 
was crucial moment for the accused in the process of proving their guilt. By 
contrast to the Nuremberg judgment, the first recourse in considering 
defendants’ criminal liability was the virtue of their position from which 
they were enabled to shape the aggressive policy of Japan. Primarily, 
positions in the military and the Government were discussed. One of the 
defendants, Heitaro Kimura, was not a leader according to the court and still 
was found guilty for aggression. The IMTFE held that from a position of 
Vice-Minister of War he possessed necessary knowledge of the Japan’s 
aggressive plans, and hence he was regarded as an accessory in the 
conspiracy to wage aggressive war. The IMTFE found that his conducting 
verbs were advices, development and formulation of aggressive plans, 
which he initiated. At that time that was sufficiently enough to entail 
individual criminal responsibility. 
 The first time ever where the issue of leadership was addressed 
explicitly was in the High Command case before the NMT. The court 
maintained that only a person in a position to ‘shape or influence’ state 
policy could be found guilty for the crimes against peace. What was 
considered is de facto power of the accused; mere high position would not 
suffice this standard. Accordingly, additional effort should be made in 
producing the argument on one’s leadership status and the strict legal 
approach would not suffice in this respect.  
 Scholars argued many issues regarding the ‘shape or influence’ standard, 
which has been ultimately abandoned by the SWGCA. Some of them have 
been explained in this paper, favoring the ICC’s standard of 'control or 
direct'. One example where the IMT could have had difficulties — if the 
trial has ever took the place — is Eva Braun and her influence upon Hitler. 
Theoretically, she could be held reliable for the crime of aggression 
according to this standard, as she did or she might have had advised Hitler 
about aggressive acts. From this argumentation stems the main issue 
regarding this requirement — the broadness of potential perpetrators that 
could suffice for it. This concept would capture variety of people outside the 
power–holders’ circle, where the actual decisions upon commencing a war 
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are deliberated. That would leave room for wide interpretation, which is 
indeed not desirable in the court. 
 After Kampala in 2010 and the adoption of universal definition of 
aggression, a new leadership clause has been introduced in both Articles 
8bis(1) and 25(3bis) ICC Statute respectively. The ‘old’ concept was 
replaced with the ‘control or direct’ criteria. The leadership clause evolved 
but the purpose remained the same. In effect, not only the conducting verbs 
articulated in Article 8bis ICC Statute are attached to a person vested with 
the leadership authority, but an every mode of criminal liability set out in 
Article 25(3) ICC Statute could only be attributed to a person that is in a 
position to ‘control or direct’ state political or military action. Consequently, 
every issue regarding individual criminal responsibility in this respect 
should be placed into the leadership context.  
  The SWGCA opted justifiably for this approach over the ‘shape or 
influence’, as it focuses more directly on narrow a leadership circle where 
decisions about the war are being made. Broadening the ambit of individual 
criminal responsibility would not commensurate with the primary post-
WWII Allies’ aspiration, where incentive was to bring to justice only the 
most responsible individuals for mass atrocities. Moreover, the promise of 
the American Chief Prosecutor Justice Robert Jackson could be hardly 
understood as a wish to put on a trial every person with some forms of 
authority that participated in furthering the war. Rather, it was a wish 
expressed in order to prosecute only the power-holders that could influence 
more severely state policy and lead it into the war. It seems that ‘control or 
direct’ standard lives up to such expectations. Both terms are related to the 
factual power over a state. ‘Control’ implies that a person accorded with 
such power is a leader, because without his or her participation acts of 
aggression would not occur. On the other hand, role of the term ‘direct’ is a 
rather negative one; i.e. it excludes from criminal liability persons who are 
in a position to influence actual power-holders, but without being in a such 
position. Arguably, this interpretation represent the milestone in the 
discourse situated around the crime of aggression, as the focus now is 
strictly on a very narrow circle of power-berries that have the actual power 
to lead their state into war.  
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 Problems with the ICC leadership standard are many. First of all, there is 
no any case law, international nor national, that could be employed in this 
respect. Secondly, and more importantly, terms ‘control’ and ‘direct’ have 
been taken outside of international criminal law. It would be very difficult 
to argue that this would not render issues in criminal proceedings, as 
lawyers of defendants will most probably avail themselves of the lack of a 
clearly established interpretation. Finally, provision which asserts that only 
a person who is regarded as a leader could be found responsible for the 
crime of aggression, does not however, yet unfortunately, say much of how 
to assess that position and to determine who are the perpetrators. Strictly 
legal approach could be employed in furthering that cause, i.e. looking into 
the Constitution of a country is perhaps logically the first step in identifying 
position of a leadership. Nevertheless, as stressed above, the factual power 
is what matter and the exclusive legal analysis will fall short at some point. 
 One of the proposed solutions is the practical application of the 
Weberian theory of authority. Weber spelled out three types of political 
leadership from which the legal-rational concept was allocated with the 
most attention in this paper. It is unquestionably mainly state orientated 
concept and the scope of its application could be hardly employed in the 
post-bureaucratic organizations, such as non-state actors. However, 
according to the ICC definition acts of aggression could be committed only 
by a state, and therefore state conducts represent constraint to the analysis in 
this thesis.  
 As I attempted to elucidate, this concept undergirds the modern state 
governance since it is applicable to the large bureaucratic organization. 
People obey their superiors because of the fear of legal repercussions on the 
first place, which are legitimate in this system of authority. By contrast, 
persons in a leadership position have different incentives. Mainly, their 
conducts are defined by their idealistic or personal aspirations. In the light 
of the definition of aggression, only those power-holders that are in a 
position to ‘control or direct’ state policy are to be regarded as leaders. By 
implementing this sociological principle with other related theories, 
leadership with such authority could be indeed traced in the vast 
bureaucratic apparatus, such as state organization. 
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 Purposely, and yet remotely, I mentioned ‘other related theories’ that 
could guide us to identify perpetrators for this crime. Purposely I say 
because, pure sociological perception is not sufficient tool for the court in 
determining which individuals that are most responsible for aggression. In 
assessing a large organization, one could find himself or herself lost if he or 
she follows only traces of authority from the lowest to the highest. 
Combination with the legal approach seems as a workable solution. 
Practically, starting point for the court would be to look at the legal system 
and then by using the sociological theory trace the highest authority in a 
state.  
 Remotely I say because, in furthering the answer to the posed questions 
in this thesis, I have mainly put an effort to place the individual criminal 
responsibility in the leadership concept and from there I have embarked 
upon identifying those who could meet this standard. What drew my interest 
the most was the Weberian theory that has been somewhat used in the past. 
A few scholars have already reflected on this concept and that was my 
foundation for the analysis. I have acknowledged their opinion, and yet 
endeavored to provide a new facet to this issue. I am of the opinion that 
different theories of leadership, such as political or ethical, would entail 
more research that would overstep the analytical approach, which is 
required in the master’s thesis.   
 According to the Rome Statute, the ICC may prosecute aggression 
starting from 2017. There are however many different governmental 
systems in the world where some of them resemble others and third ones are 
fundamentally different than those ones.  Therefore, in every case the court 
should assess individual criminal responsibility differently. Several 
problems might impede prosecution since in the moment of writing this 
thesis there has not been even one serious discussion within the ICC 
regarding the issue of individual criminal responsibility in this respect.  
 Firstly, normative content of the terms ‘control' and direct’ is lacking. As 
I mentioned earlier, both terms came from outside of international criminal 
law instruments and they could be interpreted differently than in the area 
from which they are taken from. I strongly believe that a comprehensive 
analysis is needed in this respect, since the legal systems within the purview 
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of the ICC vary significantly. The sociological, political or ethical theories 
about the leadership in a combination with the legal approach could 
certainly bring one closer to understanding of who are those that push 
entities into the war.  
 Secondly, when the leadership is determined, the next step is to place 
modes of individual criminal liability into that context. As Article 25(3bis) 
ICC Statute stipulates that primary and secondary perpetrators could be 
found guilty for this crime only if they are regarded as leaders. In other key, 
influence upon the state policy through another person could not entail 
criminal responsibility. One could be prosecuted for aiding and abetting 
only if there is a nexus between that person and the state governance itself, 
i.e. he or she is in a position to ‘control or direct’ political or military 
actions of the state. The ICC should pay special attention to this problem 
since leaders have different incentives than subordinate, and thus their 
conducts are expressed in different forms. 
 Having in mind these issues, prosecuting aggression could be indeed 
onerous for the ICC since the adequate scholarship follow-up to the 
Kampala Conference never took the place in this respect. From the 
jurisprudence of the ICTY we have learned that a sparse legal doctrine 
could render uncertainty in international law and thus affect the legitimacy 
of the court's proceedings. As for the crime of aggression, there is no 
conspicuous case law that the ICC could rely upon in future trials. It is thus 
necessary to set out a clear limitations to the terms employed in this respect, 
as without those there is a broad leeway for interpretation. It will ultimately 
weaken the rule of law and to the same extant shake already jeopardized 
authority of the ICC. More research is needed in this area. 
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